Presidents of the United States

#	President	In Office
1.	George Washington	1789-1797
2.	John Adams	1797-1801
3.	Thomas Jefferson	1801-1809
4.	James Madison	1809-1817
5.	James Monroe	1817-1825
6.	John Quincy Adams	1825-1829
7.	Andrew Jackson	1829-1837
8.	Martin Van Buren	1837-1841
9.	William Henry Harrison	1841
10.	John Tyler	1841-1845
11.	James Knox Polk	1845-1849
12.	Zachary Taylor	1849-1850
13.	Millard Fillmore	1850-1853
14.	Franklin Pierce	1853-1857
15.	James Buchanan	1857-1861
16.	Abraham Lincoln	1861-1865
17.	Andrew Johnson	1865-1869
18.	Ulysses S. Grant	1869-1877
19.	Rutherford Birchard Hayes	1877-1881
20.	James Abram Garfield	1881
21.	Chester Alan Arthur	1881-1885
22.	Grover Cleveland	1885-1889
23.	Benjamin Harrison	1889-1893
24.	Grover Cleveland	1893-1897
25.	William McKinley	1897-1901
26.	Theodore Roosevelt	1901-1909
27.	William Howard Taft	1909-1913
28.	Woodrow Wilson	1913-1921
29.	Warren Gamaliel Harding	1921-1923
30.	Calvin Coolidge	1923-1929
31.	Herbert Clark Hoover	1929-1933
32.	Franklin Delano Roosevelt	1933-1945
33.	Harry S. Truman	1945-1953
34.	Dwight David Eisenhower	1953-1961
35.	John Fitzgerald Kennedy	1961-1963
36.	Lyndon Baines Johnson	1963-1969
37.	Richard Milhous Nixon	1969-1974
38.	Gerald Rudolph Ford	1974-1977
39.	James Earl Carter, Jr.	1977-1981
40.	Ronald Wilson Reagan	1981-1989
41.	George Herbert Walker Bush	1989-1993
42.	William Jefferson Clinton	1993-2001
43.	George Walker Bush	2001-2009
44.	Barack Hussein Obama	2009-

Presidents of the United States Who did not Deliver an Inaugural Address

• John Tyler
• Millard Fillmore
• Andrew Johnson
• Chester A. Arthur
• Gerald Ford

William Henry Harrison’s Inaugural Address

March 4, 1841.

Called from a retirement which I had supposed was to continue for the residue of my life, to fill the chief executive office of this great and free nation, I appear before you, fellow-citizens, to take the oath which the constitution prescribes as a necessary qualification for the performance of its duties. And in obedience to a custom coeval with our government, and what I believe to be your expectations, I proceed to present to you a summary of the principles which will govern me in the discharge of the duties which I shall be called upon to perform.

It was the remark of a Roman consul, in an early period of that celebrated republic, that a most striking contrast was observable in the conduct of candidates for offices of power and trust, before and after obtaining them — they seldom carrying out in the latter case the pledges and promises made in the former. However much the world may have improved, in many respects, in the lapse of upward of two thousand years since the remark was made by the virtuous and indignant Roman, I fear that a strict examination of the annals of some of the modern elective governments would develop similar instances of violated confidence.

Although the fiat of the people has gone forth, proclaiming me the chief magistrate of this glorious Union, nothing upon their part remaining to be done, it may be thought that a motive may exist to keep up the delusion under which they may be supposed to have acted in relation to my principles and opinions; and perhaps there may be some in this assembly who have come here either prepared to condemn those I shall now deliver, or, approving them, to doubt the sincerity with which they are uttered. But the lapse of a few months will confirm or dispel their fears. The outline of principles to govern, and measures to be adopted by an administration not yet begun, will soon be exchanged for immutable history, and I shall stand, either exonerated by my countrymen, or classed with the mass of those who promised that they might deceive, and flattered with the intention to betray.

However strong may be my present purpose to realize the expectations of a magnanimous and confiding people, I too well understand the infirmities of human nature, and the dangerous temptations to which I shall be exposed, from the magnitude of the power which it has been the will of the people to commit to my hands, not to place my chief confidence upon the aid of that Almighty Power which has hitherto protected me, and enabled me to bring to favorable issues other important but still greatly inferior trusts, heretofore confided to me by my country.

The broad foundation upon which our constitution rests being the people — a breath of theirs having made, as a breath can unmake, change, or modify it — it can be assigned to none of the great divisions of government but to that of democracy. If such is its theory, those who are called upon to administer it must recognise, as its leading principle, the duty of shaping their measures, so as to produce the greatest good to the greatest number. But, with these broad admissions, if we could compare the sovereignty acknowledged to exist in the mass of the people with the power claimed by other sovereignties, even by those which have been considered most purely democratic, we shall find a most essential difference. All others lay claim to power limited only by their own will. The majority of our citizens, on the contrary, possess a sovereignty with an amount of power precisely equal to that which has been granted to them by the parties to the national compact, and nothing beyond. We admit of no government by divine right: believing that, so far as power is concerned, the beneficent Creator has made no distinction among men, that all are upon an equality, and that the only legitimate right to govern is an express grant of power from the governed. The constitution of the United States is the instrument containing the grant of power to the several departments composing the government. On an examination of that instrument, it will be found to contain declarations of power granted, and of power withheld. The latter is also susceptible of division into power which the majority had the right to grant, but which they did not think proper to intrust to their agents, and that which they could not have granted, not being possessed by themselves. In other words, there are certain rights possessed by each individual American citizen, which, in his compact with the others, he has never surrendered. Some of them, indeed, he is unable to surrender; being, in the language of our system, inalienable.

The boasted privilege of a Roman citizen was to him a shield only against a petty provincial ruler, while the proud democrat of Athens could console himself under a sentence of death, for a supposed violation of the national faith, which no one understood, and which at times was the subject of the mockery of all, or of banishment from his home, his family, and his country, with or without an alleged cause: that it was the act, not of a single tyrant, or hated aristocracy, but of his assembled countrymen. Far different is the power of our sovereignty. It can interfere with no one's faith, prescribe forms of worship for no one's observance, inflict no punishment but after well-ascertained guilt, the result of investigation under forms prescribed by the constitution itself. These precious privileges, and those scarcely less important of giving expression to his thoughts and opinions, either by writing or speaking, unrestrained but by the liability for injury to others, and that of a full participation in all the advantages which flow from the government, the acknowledged property of all, the American citizen derives from no charter granted from his fellow-man. He claims them because he is himself a man, fashioned by the same Almighty hand as the rest of his species, and entitled to a full share of the blessings with which he has endowed them.

Notwithstanding the limited sovereignty possessed by the people of the United States, and the restricted grant of power to the government which they have adopted, enough has been given to accomplish all the objects for which it was created. It has been found powerful in war, and, hitherto, justice has been administered, an intimate union effected, domestic tranquillity preserved, and personal liberty secured to the citizen. As was to be expected, however, from the defect of language, and the necessarily sententious manner in which the constitution is written, disputes have arisen as to the amount of power which it has actually granted, or was intended to grant. This is more particularly the case in relation to that pan of the instrument which treats of the legislative branch. And not only as regards the exercise of powers claimed under a general clause, giving that body the authority to pass all laws necessary to carry into effect the specified powers, but in relation to the latter also. It is, however, consolatory to reflect that most of the instances of alleged departure from the letter or spirit of the constitution have ultimately received the sanction of a majority of the people. And the fact, that many of our statesmen, most distinguished for talent and patriotism, have been, at one time or other of their political career, on both sides of each of the most warmly disputed questions, forces upon us the inference that the errors, if errors there were, are attributable to the intrinsic difficulty, in many instances, of ascertaining the intentions of the framers of the constitution, rather than the influence of any sinister or unpatriotic motive.

But the great danger to our institutions does not appear to me to be in a usurpation, by the government, of power not granted by the people, but by the accumulation, in one of the departments, of that which was assigned to others. Limited as are powers which have been granted, still enough have been granted to constitute a despotism, if concentrated in one of the departments. This danger is greatly heightened, as it has always been observable that men are less jealous of encroachments of one department upon another, than upon their own reserved rights.

When the constitution of the United States first came from the hands of the convention which formed it, many of the sternest republicans of the day were alarmed at the extent of the power which had been granted to the federal government, and more particularly of that portion which had been assigned to the executive branch. There were in it features which appeared not to be in harmony with their ideas of a simple representative democracy, or republic. And knowing the tendency of power to increase itself, particularly when executed by a single individual, predictions were made that, at no very remote period, the government would terminate in virtual monarchy. It would not become me to say that the fears of these patriots have been already realized. But, as I sincerely believe that the tendency of measures, and of men's opinions, for some years past, has been in that direction, it is, I conceive, strictly proper that I should take this occasion to repeat the assurances 1 have heretofore given, of my determination to arrest the progress of that tendency, if it really exists, and restore the government to its pristine health and vigor, as far as this can be effected by any legitimate exercise of the power placed in my hands.

I proceed to state, in as summary a manner as I can, my opinion of the sources of the evils which have been so extensively complained of, and the correctives which may be applied. Some of the former are unquestionably to be found in the defects of the constitution; others, in my judgment, are attributable to misconstruction of some of its provisions. Of the former is the eligibility of the same individual to a second term of the presidency. The sagacious mind of Mr. Jefferson early saw and lamented this error, and attempts have been made, hitherto without success, to apply the amendatory power of the states to its correction.

As, however, one mode of correction is in the power of every president, and consequently in mine, it would be useless, and perhaps invidious, to enumerate the evils of which, in the opinion of many of our fellow-citizens, this error of the sages who framed the constitution may have been the source, and the bitter fruits which we are still to gather from it, if it continues to disfigure our system. It may be observed, however, as a general remark, that republics can commit no greater error than to adopt or continue any feature in their systems of government which may be calculated to create or increase the love of power in the bosoms of those to whom necessity obliges them to commit the management of their affairs. And surely nothing is more likely to produce such a stale of mind than the long continuance of an office of high trust. Nothing can be more corrupting, nothing more destructive of all those noble feelings which belong to the character of a devoted republican patriot. When this corrupting passion once takes possession of the human mind, like the love of gold, it becomes insatiable. It is the never-dying worm in his bosom, grows with his growth, and strengthens with the declining years of its victim. If this is true, it is the part of wisdom for a republic to limit the service of that officer, at least, to whom she has intrusted the management of her foreign relations, the execution of her laws, and the command of her armies and navies, to a period so short as to prevent his forgetting that he is the accountable agent, not the principal — the servant, not the master. Until an amendment of the constitution can be effected, public opinion may secure the desired object. 1 give my aid to it by renewing the pledge heretofore given, that, under no circumstances, will I consent to serve a second term.

But if there is danger to public liberty from the acknowledged defects of the constitution, in the want of limit to the continuance of the executive power in the same hands, there is, I apprehend, not much less from a misconstruction of that instrument, as it regards the powers actually given. I can not conceive that, by a fair construction, any or either of its provisions would be found to constitute the president a part of the legislative power. It can not be claimed from the power to recommend, since, although enjoined as a duty upon him, it is a privilege which he holds in common with every other citizen. And although there may be something more of confidence in the propriety of the measures recommended in the one case than in the other, in the obligations of ultimate decision there can be no difference. In the language of the constitution, “all the legislative powers” which it grants “are vested in the Congress of the United States.”  It would be a solecism in language to say that any portion of these is not included in the whole.

It may be said, indeed, that the constitution has given to the executive the power to annul the acts of the legislative body by refusing to them his assent. So a similar power has necessarily resulted from that instrument to the judiciary; and yet the judiciary forms no part of the legislature. There is, it is true, this difference between these grants of power: the executive can put his negative upon the acts of the legislature, for other cause than that of want of conformity to the constitution, while the judiciary can only declare void those which violate that instrument. But the decision of the judiciary is final in such a case, whereas, in every instance where the veto of the executive is applied, it may be overcome by a vote of two-thirds of both houses of Congress. The negative upon the acts of the legislative, by the execute authority, and that in the hands of one individual, would seem to be an incongruity in our system. Like some others of a similar character, however, it appears to be highly expedient; and if used only with the forbearance and in the spirit which was intended by its authors, it may be productive of great good, and be found one of the best safeguards to the Union.

At the period of the formation of the constitution, the principle does not appear to have enjoyed much favor in the state governments. It existed but in two, and in one of these there was a plural executive. If we would search for the motives which operated upon the purely patriotic and enlightened assembly which framed the constitution, for the adoption of a provision so apparently repugnant to the leading democratic principle, that the majority should govern, we must reject the idea that they anticipated from it any benefit to the ordinary course of legislation. They knew too well the high degree of intelligence which existed among the people, and the enlightened character of the state legislatures, not to have the fullest confidence that the two bodies elected by them would be worthy representatives of such constituents, and, of course, that they would require no aid in conceiving and maturing the measures which the circumstances of the country might require. And it is preposterous to suppose that a thought could for a moment have been entertained that the president, placed at the capital, in the centre of the country, could better understand the wants and wishes of the people than their own immediate representatives, who spend a part of every year among them, living with them, often laboring with them, and bound to them by the triple tie of interest, duty, and affection. To assist or control Congress, then, in its ordinary legislation, could not, I conceive, have been the motive for conferring the veto power on the president. This argument acquires additional force from the fact of its never having been thus used by the first six presidents — and two of them were members of the convention, one presiding over its deliberations, and the other having a larger share in consummating the labors of that august body than any other person. But if bills were never returned to Congress by either of the presidents above referred to, upon the ground of their being inexpedient, or not as well adapted as they might be to the wants of the people, the veto was applied upon that of want of conformity to the constitution, or because errors had been committed from a too hasty enactment.

There is another ground for the adoption of the veto principle which had probably more influence in recommending it to the convention than any other. I refer to the security which it gives to the just and equitable action of the legislature upon all parts of the Union. It could not but have occurred to the convention that, in a country so extensive, embracing so great a variety of soil and climate, and, consequently, of products, and which, from the same causes, must ever exhibit a great difference in the amount of the population of its various sections, calling for a great diversity in the employments of the people, that the legislation of the majority might not always justly regard the rights and interests of the minority; and acts of this character might be passed, under an express grant by the words of the constitution, and, therefore, not within the competency of the judiciary to declare void; that however enlightened and patriotic they might suppose, from past experience, the members of Congress might be, and however largely partaking, in general, of the liberal feelings of the people, it was impossible to expect that bodies so constituted should not sometimes be controlled by local interests and sectional feelings. It was proper, therefore, to provide some umpire, from whose situation and mode of appointment more independence and freedom from such influences might be expected. Such a one was afforded by the executive department, constituted by the constitution. A person elected to that high office, having his constituents in every section, slate, and subdivision of the Union, must consider himself bound by the most solemn sanctions, to guard, protect, and defend, the rights of all, and of every portion, great or small, from the injustice and oppression of the rest. I consider the veto power, therefore, given by the constitution to the executive of the United States, solely as a conservative power: to be used only, 1st. to protect the constitution from violation; 2dly, the people from the effects of hasty legislation, where their will has been probably disregarded or not well understood; and, 3dly, to prevent the effects of combinations violative of the rights of the minorities. In reference to the second of these objects, I may observe that I consider it the right and privilege of the people to decide disputed points of the constitution, arising from the general grant of power to Congress to carry into effect the powers expressly given. And I believe, with Mr. Madison, “that repeated recognitions under varied circumstances, in acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government, accompanied by indications in different modes of the concurrence of the general will of the nation, afford to the president sufficient authority for his considering such disputed point as settled.”

Upward of half a century has elapsed since the adoption of our present form of government. It would be an object more highly desirable than the gratification of the curiosity of speculaive statesmen, if its precise situation could be ascertained, a fair exhibit made of the operations of each of its departments, of the powers which they respectively claim and exercise, of the collisions which have occurred between them, or between the whole government and those of the states, or either of them. We could then compare our actual condition, after fifty years' trial of our system, with what it was in the commencement of its operations, and ascertain whether the predictions of the patriots who opposed its adoption, or the confident hopes of its advocates, have been best realized. The great dread of the former seems to have been, that the reserved powers of the state would be absorbed by those of the federal governments, and a consolidated power established, leaving to the states the shadow, only, of that independent action for which they had so zealously contended, and on the preservation of which they relied as the last hope of liberty. Without denying that the result to which they looked with so much apprehension is in the way of being realized, it is obvious that they did not clearly see the mode of its accomplishment. The general government has seized upon none of the reserved rights of the states. As far as any open warfare may have gone, the state authorities have amply maintained their rights. To a casual observer, our system presents no appearance of discord between the different members which compose it. Even the addition of many new ones has produced no jarring. They move in their respective orbits in perfect harmony with the central head, and with each other. But there is still an under current at work, by which, if not seasonably checked, the worst apprehensions of our anti-federal patriots will be realized. And not only will the state authorities be overshadowed by the great increase of power in the executive department of the general government, but the character of that government, if not its designation, be essentially and radically changed. This state of things has been, in part, effected by causes inherent in the constitution, and in part, by the never-failing tendency of political power to increase itself.

By making the president the sole distributor of all the patronage of the government, the framers of the constitution do not appear to have anticipated at how short a period it would become a formidable instrument to control the free operations of the state governments. Of trifling importance at first, it had, early in Mr. Jefferson's administration, become so powerful as to create great alarm in the mind of that patriot, from the potent influence it might exert in controlling the freedom of the elective franchise. If such could have then been the effects of its influence, how much greater must be the danger at this time, quadrupled in amount, as it certainly is, and more completely under the control of the executive will, than their construction of their powers allowed, or the forbearing characters of all the early presidents permitted them to make? But it is not by the extent of its patronage alone that the executive department has become dangerous, but by the use which it appears may be made of the appointing power, to bring under its control the whole revenues of the country. The constitution has declared it to be the duty of the president to see that the laws are executed, and it makes him the commander-in-chief of the armies and navy of the United States. If the opinion of the most approved writers upon that species of mixed government, which, in modern Europe, is termed monarchy, in contradistinction to despotism, is correct, there was wanting no other addition to the powers of our chief magistrate to stamp a monarchical character on our government, but the control of the public finances. And to me it appears strange indeed, that anyone should doubt that the entire control which the president possesses over the officers who have the custody of the public money, by the power of removal with or without cause, does, for all mischievous purposes at least, virtually subject the treasure also to his disposal.

The first Roman emperor, in his attempt to seize the sacred treasure, silenced the opposition of the officer to whose charge it had been committed, by a significant allusion to his sword. By a selection of political instruments For the care of the public money, a reference to their commissions by a president would be quite as effectual an argument as that of Csesar to the Roman knight. I am not insensible of the great difficulty that exists in devising a proper plan for the safekeeping and disbursement of the public revenues, and I know the importance which has been attached by men of great abilities and patriotism to the divorce, as it is called, of the treasury from the banking institutions. It is not the divorce which is complained of, but the unhallowed union of the treasury with the executive department which has created such extensive alarm. To this danger to our republican institutions, and that created by the influence given to the executive through the instrumentality of the federal officers, I propose to apply all the remedies which may be at my command. It was certainly a great error in the framers of the constitution, not to have made the officer at the head of the treasury department entirely independent of the executive. He should at least have been removable only upon the demand of the popular branch of the legislature. I have determined never to remove a secretary of the treasury without communicating all the circumstances attending such removal to both houses of Congress. The influence of the executive in controlling the freedom of the elective franchise through the medium of the public officers can be effectually checked by renewing the prohibition published by Mr. Jefferson, forbidding their interference in elections, further than giving their own votes; and their own independence secured by an assurance of perfect immunity, in exercising this sacred privilege of freemen under the dictates of their own unbiased judgments. Never, with my consent, shall an officer of the people, compensated for his services out of their pockets, become the pliant instrument of executive will.

There is no part of the means placed in the hands of the executive, which might be used with greater effect, for unhallowed purposes, than the control of the public press. The maxim which our ancestors derived from the mother-country, that “the freedom of the press is the great bulwark of civil and religious liberty,” is one of the most precious legacies which they left us. We have learned, too, from our own as well as the experience of other countries, that golden shackles, by whomsoever or by whatever pretence imposed, are as fatal to it as the iron bonds of despotism. The presses in the necessary employment of the government should never be used “to clear the guilty, or to varnish crimes.” A decent and manly examination of the acts of the government should be not only tolerated but encouraged.

Upon another occasion I have given my opinion, at some length, upon the impropriety of executive interference in the legislation of Congress. That the article in the constitution making it the duty of the president to communicate information, and authorizing him to recommend measures, was not intended to make him the source of legislation, and, in particular, that he should never be looked to for schemes of finance. It would be very strange, indeed, that the constitution should have strictly forbidden one branch of the legislature from interfering in the origination of such bills, and that it should be considered proper that an altogether different department of the government should be permitted to do so. Some of our best political maxims and opinions have been drawn from our parent isle.

There are others, however, which can not be introduced in our system without singular incongruity, and the production of much mischief. And this I conceive to be one. No matter in which of the houses of parliament a bill may originate, nor by whom introduced, a minister, or a member of the opposition, by the fiction of law, or rather of constitutional principle, the sovereign is supposed to have prepared it agreeably to his will, and then submitted it to parliament for their advice and consent. Now, the very reverse is the case here, not only with regard to the principle but the forms prescribed by the constitution. The principle certainly assigns to the only body constituted by the constitution (the legislative body) the power to make laws, and the forms even direct that the enactment should be ascribed to them. The senate, in relation to revenue bills, have the right to propose amendments; and so has the executive, by the power given him to return them to the house of representatives, with his objections. It is in his power, also, to propose amendments in the existing laws, suggested by his observations upon their defective or injurious operation. But the delicate duty of devising schemes of revenue should be left where the constitution has placed it — with the immediate representatives of the people. For similar reasons, the mode of keeping the public treasure should be prescribed by them; and the further removed it may be from the control of the executive, the more wholesome the arrangement, and the more in accordance with republican principle.

Connected with this subject is the character of the currency. The idea of making it exclusively metallic, however well intended, appears to me to be fraught with more fatal consequences than any other scheme, having no relation to the personal rights of the citizen that has ever been devised. If any single scheme could produce the effect of arresting, at once, that mutation of condition by which thousands of our most indigent fellow-citizens, by their industry and enterprise, are raised to the possession of wealth, that is the one. If there is one measure better calculated than another to produce that state of things so much deprecated by all true republicans, by which the rich are daily adding to their hoards, and the poor sinking deeper into penury, it is an exclusive metallic currency. Or if there is a process by which the character of the country for generosity and nobleness of feeling may be destroyed by the great increase and necessary toleration of usury, it is an exclusive metallic currency.

Among the other duties of a delicate character which the president is called upon to perform, is the supervision of the government of the territories of the United States. Those of them which are destined to become members of our great political family, are compensated by their rapid progress from infancy to manhood, for the partial and temporary deprivation of their political rights. It is in this district only, where American citizens are to be found, who, under a settled system of policy, are deprived of many important political privileges, without any inspiring hope as to the future. Their only consolation, under circumstances of such deprivation, is that of the devoted exterior guards of a camp — that their sufferings secure tranquillity and safety within.

Are there any of their countrymen who would subject them to greater sacrifices, to any other humiliations than those essentially necessary to the security of the object for which they were thus separated from their fellow-citizens? Are their rights alone not to be guarantied by the application of those great principles upon which all our constitutions are founded? We are told by the greatest of British orators and statesmen, that, at the commencement of the war of the revolution, the most stupid men in England spoke of “their American subjects.” Are there, indeed, citizens of any of our states who have dreamed of their subjects in the District of Columbia? Such dreams can never be realized by any agency of mine.

The people of the District of Columbia are not the subjects of the people of the states, but free American citizens. Being in the latter condition when the constitution was formed, no words used in that instrument could have been intended to deprive them of that character. If there is anything in the great principles of inalienable rights, so emphatically insisted upon in our Declaration of Independence, they could neither make, nor the United States accept, a surrender of their liberties, and become the subjects, in other words, the slaves, of their former fellow-citizens. If this be true, and it will scarcely be denied by any one who has a correct idea of his own rights as an American citizen, the grant to Congress of exclusive jurisdiction in the District of Columbia, can be interpreted, so far as respects the aggregate people of the United States, as meaning nothing more than to allow to Congress the controlling power necessary to afford a free and safe exercise of the functions assigned to the general government by the constitution. In all other respects, the legislation of Congress should be adapted to their peculiar position and wants, and be conformable with their deliberate opinions of their own interests.

I have spoken of the necessity of keeping the respective departments of the government, as well as all the other authorities of our country, within their appropriate orbits. This is a matter of difficulty in some cases, as the powers which they respectively claim are not defined by very distinct lines. Mischievous, however, in their tendencies, as collisions of this kind may be, those which arise between the respective communities, which for certain purposes compose one nation, are much more so; for no such nation can long exist without the careful culture of those feelings of confidence and affection which are the effective bonds of union between free and confederate states. Strong as is the tie of interest, it has been often found ineffectual. Men, blinded by their passions, have been known to adopt measures for their country in direct opposition to all the suggestions of policy. The alternative, then, is to destroy or keep down a bad passion by creating and fostering a good one; and this seems to be the corner-stone upon which our American political architects have reared the fabric of our government. The cement which was to bind it, and perpetuate its existence, was the affectionate attachment between all its members. To insure the continuance of this feeling, produced at first by a community of dangers, of sufferings, and of interests, the advantages of each were made accessible to all.

No participation in any good, possessed by any member of an extensive confederacy, except in domestic government, was withheld from the citizen of any other member. By a process attended with no difficulty, no delay, no expense but that of removal, the citizen of one might become the citizen of any other, and successively of the whole. The lines, too, separating powers to be exercised by the citizens of one state from those of another, seem to be so distinctly drawn as to leave no room for misunderstanding. The citizens of each state unite in their persons all the privileges which that character confers, and all that they might claim as citizens of the United States; but in no case can the same person, at the same time, act as the citizen of two separate states, and he is therefore positively precluded from any interference with the reserved powers of any state but that of which he is, for the time being, a citizen. Ho may indeed offer to the citizens of other stales his advice as to their management, and the form in which it is tendered is left to his own discretion and sense of propriety.

It may be observed, however, that organized associations of citizens, requiring compliance with their wishes, too much resemble the recommendations of Athens to her allies, supported by an armed and powerful fleet. It was, indeed, the ambition of the leading states of Greece to control the domestic concerns of the others, that the destruction of that celebrated confederacy, and subsequently of all its members, is mainly to be attributed. And it is owing to the absence of that spirit that the Helvetic confederacy has for so many years been preserved. Never have there been seen in the institutions of the separate members of any confederacy more elements of discord. In the principles and forms of government and religion, as well as in the circumstances of the several cantons, so marked a discrepancy was observable as to promise anything but harmony in their intercourse or permanency in their alliance. And yet, for ages, neither has been interrupted. Content with the positive benefits which their union produced — with the independence and safety from foreign aggression which it secured — the sagacious people respected the institutions of each other, however repugnant to their own principles and prejudices.

Our confederacy, fellow-citizens, can only be preserved by the same forbearance. Our citizens must be content with the exercise of the powers with which the constitution clothes them. The attempt of those of one state to control the domestic institutions of another, can only result in feelings of distrust and jealousy, and are certain harbingers of disunion, violence, civil war, and the ultimate destruction of our free institutions. Our confederacy is perfectly illustrated by the terms and principles governing a common copartnership. There a fund of power is to be exercised under the direction of the joint counsels of the allied members, but that which has been reserved by the individuals is intangible by the common government, or the individual members composing it. To attempt it finds no support in the principles of our constitution. It should be our constant and earnest endeavor mutually to cultivate a spirit of concord and harmony among the various parts of our confederacy. Experience has abundantly taught us that the agitation by citizens of one part of the Union of a subject not confided to the general government, but exclusively under the guardianship of the local authorities, is productive of no other consequences than bitterness, alienation, discord, and injury to the very cause which is intended to be advanced. Of all the great interests which appertain to our country, that of union — cordial, confiding, fraternal union — is by far the most important, since it is the only true and sure guarantee of all others.

In consequence of the embarrassed state of business and the currency, some of the states may meet with difficulty in their financial concerns. However deeply we may regret anything imprudent or excessive in the engagements into which states have entered for purposes of their own, it does not become us to disparage the state governments, nor to discourage them from making proper efforts for their own relief; on the contrary, it is our duty to encourage them, to the extent of our constitutional authority, to apply their best means, and cheerfully to make all necessary sacrifices and submit to all necessary burdens to fulfil their engagements and maintain their credit ; for the character and credit of the several states form part of the character and credit of the whole country. The resources of the country are abundant, the enterprise and activity of our people proverbial; and we may well hope that wise legislation and prudent administration, by the respective governments, each acting within its own sphere, will restore former prosperity.

Unpleasant and even dangerous as collisions may sometimes be, between the constituted authorities or the citizens of our country, in relation to the lines which separate their respective jurisdictions, the result can be of no vital injury to our institutions, if that ardent patriotism, that devoted attachment to liberty, that spirit of moderation and forbearance for which our countrymen were once distinguished, continue to be cherished. If this continues to be the ruling passion of our souls, the weaker feelings of the mistaken enthusiast will be corrected, the Utopian dreams of the scheming politician dissipated, and the complicated intrigues of the demagogue rendered harmless. The spirit of liberty is the sovereign balm for every injury which our institutions receive. On the contrary, no care that can be used in the construction of our government, no division of powers, no distribution of checks in its several departments, will prove effectual to keep us a free people, if this spirit is suffered to decay; and decay it will without constant nurture. To the neglect of this duly, historians agree in attributing the ruin of all the republics with whose existence and fall their writings have made us acquainted. The same causes will ever produce the same effects; and as long as the love of power is a dominant passion of the human bosom, and as long as the understandings of men can be warped, and their affections changed by operations upon their passions and prejudices, so long will the liberty of a people depend on their own constant attention to its preservation.

The danger to all well-established free governments arises from the unwillingness of the people to believe in its existence, or from the influence of designing men, diverting their attention from the quarter whence it approaches to a source from which it can never come. This is the old trick of those who would usurp the government of their country. In the name of democracy they speak, warning the people against the influence of wealth and the danger of aristocracy. History, ancient and modem, is full of such examples. Cesar became the master of the Roman people and the senate, under the pretence of supporting the democratic claims of the former against the aristocracy of the latter; Cromwell, in the character of protector of the liberties of the people, became the dictator of England; and Bolivar possessed himself of unlimited power, with the title of his country's liberator. There is, on the contrary, no single instance on record of an extensive and well-established republic being changed into an aristocracy. The tendency of all such governments in their decline is to monarchy ; and the antagonist principle to liberty there, is, the spirit of faction — a spirit which assumes the character, and, in times of great excitement, imposes itself upon the people as the genuine spirit of freedom, and like the false Christs whose coming was foretold by the Savior, seeks to, and, were it possible, would, impose upon the true and most faithful disciples of liberty. It is in periods like this that it behooves the people to be most watchful of those to whom they have intrusted power. And although there is at times much difficulty in distinguishing the false from the true spirit, a calm and dispassionate investigation will detect the counterfeit, as well by the character of its operations as the results that are produced. The true spirit of liberty, although devoted, persevering, bold, and uncompromising in principle — that secured, is mild, and tolerant, and scrupulous as to the means it employs; while the spirit of party, assuming to be that of liberty, is harsh, vindictive, and intolerant, and totally reckless as to the character of the allies which it brings to the aid of its cause. When the genuine spirit of liberty animates the body of a people to a thorough examination of their affairs, it leads to the excision of every excrescence which may have fastened itself upon any of the departments of the government, and restores the system to its pristine health and beauty, but the reign of an intolerant spirit of party among a free people seldom fails to result in a dangerous accession to the executive power introduced and established amid unusual professions of devotion to democracy.

The foregoing remarks relate almost exclusively to matters connected with our domestic concerns. It may be proper, however, that I should give some indications to my fellow-citizens of my proposed course of conduct in the management of our foreign relations. I assure them, therefore, that it is my intention to use every means in my power to preserve the friendly intercourse which now so happily subsists with every foreign nation; and that, although, of course, not well informed as to the state of any pending negotiations with any of them, I see in the personal characters of the sovereigns, as well as in the mutual interest of our own and of the governments with which our relations are most intimate, a pleasing guarantee that the harmony so important to the interests of their subjects, as well as our citizens, will not be interrupted by the advancement of any claim or pretension upon their part to which our honor would not permit us to yield. Long the defender of my country's rights in the field, I trust that my fellow-citizens will not see in my earnest desire to preserve peace with foreign powers any indication that their rights will ever be sacrificed, or the honor of the nation tarnished, by any admission on the part of their chief magistrate unworthy of their former glory.

In our intercourse with our aboriginal neighbors, the same liberality and justice which marked the course prescribed to me, by two of my illustrious predecessors, when acting under their direction in the discharge of the dunes of superintendent and commissioner, shall be strictly observed. I can conceive of no more sublime spectacle — none more likely to propitiate an impartial Creator — than a rigid adherence to the principles of justice on the part of a powerful nation in its transactions with a weaker and uncivilized people, whom circumstances have placed at its disposal.

Before concluding, fellow-citizens, I must say something to you on the subject of the parties at this time existing in our country. To me it appears perfectly clear, that the interest of that country requires that the violence of the spirit, by which those parties are at this time governed, must be greatly mitigated, if not entirely extinguished, or consequences will ensue which are appalling to be thought of. If parties in a republic are necessary to secure a degree of vigilance sufficient to keep the public functionaries within the bounds of law and duty, at that point their usefulness ends. Beyond that they become destructive of public virtue, the parents of a spirit antagonist to that of liberty, and, eventually, its inevitable conqueror.

We have examples of republics, where the love of country and of liberty at one time were the dominant passions of the whole mass of citizens, and yet, with the continuance of the name and form of free government, not a vestige of these qualities remaining in the bosom of any one of its citizens. It was the beautiful remark of a distinguished English writer, that “in the Roman senate Octavius had a party, and Antony a party, but the commonwealth had none.” Yet the senate continued to meet in the temple of liberty, to talk of the sacredness and beauty of the commonwealth, and gaze at the statues of the elder Brutus and of the Curtii and Decii. And the people assembled in the forum, not as in the days of Camillus and the Scipios, to cast their free votes for annual magistrates or pass upon the acts of the senate, but to receive from the hands of the leaders of the respective parties their share of the spoils, and to shout for one or the other, as those collected in Gaul, or Egypt, and the Lesser Asia, would furnish the larger dividend. The spirit of liberty had fled, and, avoiding the abodes of civilized man, had sought protection in the wilds of Scythia or Scandinavia: and so, under the operation of the same causes and influences, it will fly from our capitol and our forums. A calamity so awful, not only to our country, but the world, must be deprecated by every patriot, and every tendency to a state of things likely to produce it immediately checked. Such a tendency has existed — does exist.

Always the friend of my countrymen, never their flatterer, it becomes my duty to say to them from this high place to which their partiality has exalted me, that there exists in the land a spirit hostile to their best interests — hostile to liberty itself. It is a spirit contracted in its views, selfish in its object. It looks to the aggrandizement of a few, even to the destruction of the interest of the whole. The entire remedy is with the people. Something, however, may be effected by the means which they have placed in my hands. It is union that we want — not of a party for the sake of that party — but a union of the whole country for the sake of the whole country — for the defence of its interests and its honor against foreign aggression — for the defence of those principles for which our ancestors so gloriously contended. As far as it depends upon me, it shall be accomplished. All the influence that I possess, shall he exerted to prevent the formation at least of an executive party in the halls of the legislative body. I wish for the support of no member of that body to any measure of mine that does not satisfy his judgment and his sense of duty to those from whom he holds his appointment, nor any confidence in advance from the people, but that asked for by Mr. Jefferson, “to give firmness and effect to the legal administration of their affairs.”

I deem the present occasion sufficiently important and solemn to justify me in expressing to my fellow-citizens a profound reverence for the Christian religion, and a thorough conviction that sound morals, religious liberty, and a just sense of religious responsibility, are essentially connected with all true and lasting happiness ; and to that good Being who has blessed us by the gifts of civil and religious freedom, who watched over and prospered the labors of our fathers, and has hitherto preserved to us institutions far exceeding in excellence those of any other people, let us unite in fervently commending every interest of our beloved country in all future time.

[Here the oath of office was administered by Chief-Justice Taney.]

Fellow-citizens: Being fully invested with that high office to which the partiality of my countrymen has called me, 1 now take an affectionate leave of you. You will bear with you to your homes the remembrance of the pledge I have this day given to discharge all the high duties of my exalted station according to the best of my ability; and I shall enter upon their performance with entire confidence in the support of a just and generous people.

SOURCE: Edwin Williams, Editor, Statesman’s Manual: President’s Messages, Inaugural, Annual and Special from 1749-1846, Volume 2, p. 1197-1210

Martin Van Buren’s Inaugural Address

March 4, 1837

Fellow-citizens: The practice of all my predecessors imposes on me an obligation I cheerfully fulfill — to accompany the first and solemn act of my public trust with an avowal of the principles that will guide me in performing it and an expression of my feelings on assuming a charge so responsible and vast. In imitating their example I tread in the footsteps of illustrious men, whose superiors it is our happiness to believe are not found on the executive calendar of any country. Among them we recognize the earliest and firmest pillars of the Republic — those by whom our national independence was first declared, him who above all others contributed to establish it on the field of battle, and those whose expanded intellect and patriotism constructed, improved, and perfected the inestimable institutions under which we live. If such men in the position I now occupy felt themselves overwhelmed by a sense of gratitude for this the highest of all marks of their country's confidence, and by a consciousness of their inability adequately to discharge the duties of an office so difficult and exalted, how much more must these considerations affect one who can rely on no such claims for favor or forbearance! Unlike all who have preceded me, the Revolution that gave us existence as one people was achieved at the period of my birth; and whilst I contemplate with grateful reverence that memorable event, I feel that I belong to a later age and that I may not expect my countrymen to weigh my actions with the same kind and partial hand.

So sensibly, fellow-citizens, do these circumstances press themselves upon me that I should not dare to enter upon my path of duty did I not look for the generous aid of those who will be associated with me in the various and coordinate branches of the Government; did I not repose with unwavering reliance on the patriotism, the intelligence, and the kindness of a people who never yet deserted a public servant honestly laboring in their cause; and, above all, did I not permit myself humbly to hope for the sustaining support of an ever-watchful and beneficent Providence.

To the confidence and consolation derived from these sources it would be ungrateful not to add those which spring from our present fortunate condition. Though not altogether exempt from embarrassments that disturb our tranquility at home and threaten it abroad, yet in all the attributes of a great, happy, and flourishing people we stand without a parallel in the world. Abroad we enjoy the respect and, with scarcely an exception, the friendship of every nation; at home, while our Government quietly but efficiently performs the sole legitimate end of political institutions — in doing the greatest good to the greatest number — we present an aggregate of human prosperity surely not elsewhere to be found.

How imperious, then, is the obligation imposed upon every citizen, in his own sphere of action, whether limited or extended, to exert himself in perpetuating a condition of things so singularly happy! All the lessons of history and experience must be lost upon us if we are content to trust alone to the peculiar advantages we happen to possess. Position and climate and the bounteous resources that nature has scattered with so liberal a hand — even the diffused intelligence and elevated character of our people—will avail us nothing if we fail sacredly to uphold those political institutions that were wisely and deliberately formed with reference to every circumstance that could preserve or might endanger the blessings we enjoy. The thoughtful framers of our Constitution legislated for our country as they found it. Looking upon it with the eyes of statesmen and patriots, they saw all the sources of rapid and wonderful prosperity; but they saw also that various habits, opinions, and institutions peculiar to the various portions of so vast a region were deeply fixed. Distinct sovereignties were in actual existence, whose cordial union was essential to the welfare and happiness of all. Between many of them there was, at least to some extent, a real diversity of interests, liable to be exaggerated through sinister designs; they differed in size, in population, in wealth, and in actual and prospective resources and power; they varied in the character of their industry and staple productions, and [in some] existed domestic institutions which, unwisely disturbed, might endanger the harmony of the whole. Most carefully were all these circumstances weighed, and the foundations of the new Government laid upon principles of reciprocal concession and equitable compromise. The jealousies which the smaller States might entertain of the power of the rest were allayed by a rule of representation confessedly unequal at the time, and designed forever to remain so. A natural fear that the broad scope of general legislation might bear upon and unwisely control particular interests was counteracted by limits strictly drawn around the action of the Federal authority, and to the people and the States was left unimpaired their sovereign power over the innumerable subjects embraced in the internal government of a just republic, excepting such only as necessarily appertain to the concerns of the whole confederacy or its intercourse as a united community with the other nations of the world.

This provident forecast has been verified by time. Half a century, teeming with extraordinary events, and elsewhere producing astonishing results, has passed along, but on our institutions it has left no injurious mark. From a small community we have risen to a people powerful in numbers and in strength; but with our increase has gone hand in hand the progress of just principles. The privileges, civil and religious, of the humblest individual are still sacredly protected at home, and while the valor and fortitude of our people have removed far from us the slightest apprehension of foreign power, they have not yet induced us in a single instance to forget what is right. Our commerce has been extended to the remotest nations; the value and even nature of our productions have been greatly changed; a wide difference has arisen in the relative wealth and resources of every portion of our country; yet the spirit of mutual regard and of faithful adherence to existing compacts has continued to prevail in our councils and never long been absent from our conduct. We have learned by experience a fruitful lesson — that an implicit and undeviating adherence to the principles on which we set out can carry us prosperously onward through all the conflicts of circumstances and vicissitudes inseparable from the lapse of years.

The success that has thus attended our great experiment is in itself a sufficient cause for gratitude, on account of the happiness it has actually conferred and the example it has unanswerably given. But to me, my fellow-citizens, looking forward to the far-distant future with ardent prayers and confiding hopes, this retrospect presents a ground for still deeper delight. It impresses on my mind a firm belief that the perpetuity of our institutions depends upon ourselves; that if we maintain the principles on which they were established they are destined to confer their benefits on countless generations yet to come, and that America will present to every friend of mankind the cheering proof that a popular government, wisely formed, is wanting in no element of endurance or strength. Fifty years ago its rapid failure was boldly predicted. Latent and uncontrollable causes of dissolution were supposed to exist even by the wise and good, and not only did unfriendly or speculative theorists anticipate for us the fate of past republics, but the fears of many an honest patriot overbalanced his sanguine hopes. Look back on these forebodings, not hastily but reluctantly made, and see how in every instance they have completely failed.

An imperfect experience during the struggles of the Revolution was supposed to warrant the belief that the people would not bear the taxation requisite to discharge an immense public debt already incurred and to pay the necessary expenses of the Government. The cost of two wars has been paid, not only without a murmur, but with unequaled alacrity. No one is now left to doubt that every burden will be cheerfully borne that may be necessary to sustain our civil institutions or guard our honor or welfare. Indeed, all experience has shown that the willingness of the people to contribute to these ends in cases of emergency has uniformly outrun the confidence of their representatives.

In the early stages of the new Government, when all felt the imposing influence as they recognized the unequaled services of the first President, it was a common sentiment that the great weight of his character could alone bind the discordant materials of our Government together and save us from the violence of contending factions. Since his death nearly forty years are gone. Party exasperation has been often carried to its highest point; the virtue and fortitude of the people have sometimes been greatly tried; yet our system, purified and enhanced in value by all it has encountered, still preserves its spirit of free and fearless discussion, blended with unimpaired fraternal feeling.

The capacity of the people for self-government, and their willingness, from a high sense of duty and without those exhibitions of coercive power so generally employed in other countries, to submit to all needful restraints and exactions of municipal law, have also been favorably exemplified in the history of the American States. Occasionally, it is true, the ardor of public sentiment, outrunning the regular progress of the judicial tribunals or seeking to reach cases not denounced as criminal by the existing law, has displayed itself in a manner calculated to give pain to the friends of free government and to encourage the hopes of those who wish for its overthrow. These occurrences, however, have been far less frequent in our country than in any other of equal population on the globe, and with the diffusion of intelligence it may well be hoped that they will constantly diminish in frequency and violence. The generous patriotism and sound common sense of the great mass of our fellow-citizens will assuredly in time produce this result; for as every assumption of illegal power not only wounds the majesty of the law, but furnishes a pretext for abridging the liberties of the people, the latter have the most direct and permanent interest in preserving the landmarks of social order and maintaining on all occasions the inviolability of those constitutional and legal provisions which they themselves have made.

In a supposed unfitness of our institutions for those hostile emergencies which no country can always avoid their friends found a fruitful source of apprehension, their enemies of hope. While they foresaw less promptness of action than in governments differently formed, they overlooked the far more important consideration that with us war could never be the result of individual or irresponsible will, but must be a measure of redress for injuries sustained, voluntarily resorted to by those who were to bear the necessary sacrifice, who would consequently feel an individual interest in the contest, and whose energy would be commensurate with the difficulties to be encountered. Actual events have proved their error; the last war, far from impairing, gave new confidence to our Government, and amid recent apprehensions of a similar conflict we saw that the energies of our country would not be wanting in ample season to vindicate its rights. We may not possess, as we should not desire to possess, the extended and ever-ready military organization of other nations; we may occasionally suffer in the outset for the want of it; but among ourselves all doubt upon this great point has ceased, while a salutary experience will prevent a contrary opinion from inviting aggression from abroad.

Certain danger was foretold from the extension of our territory, the multiplication of States, and the increase of population. Our system was supposed to be adapted only to boundaries comparatively narrow. These have been widened beyond conjecture; the members of our Confederacy are already doubled, and the numbers of our people are incredibly augmented. The alleged causes of danger have long surpassed anticipation, but none of the consequences have followed. The power and influence of the Republic have risen to a height obvious to all mankind; respect for its authority was not more apparent at its ancient than it is at its present limits; new and inexhaustible sources of general prosperity have been opened; the effects of distance have been averted by the inventive genius of our people, developed and fostered by the spirit of our institutions; and the enlarged variety and amount of interests, productions, and pursuits have strengthened the chain of mutual dependence and formed a circle of mutual benefits too apparent ever to be overlooked.

In justly balancing the powers of the Federal and State authorities difficulties nearly insurmountable arose at the outset, and subsequent collisions were deemed inevitable. Amid these it was scarcely believed possible that a scheme of government so complex in construction could remain uninjured. From time to time embarrassments have certainly occurred; but how just is the confidence of future safety imparted by the knowledge that each in succession has been happily removed! Overlooking partial and temporary evils as inseparable from the practical operation of all human institutions, and looking only to the general result, every patriot has reason to be satisfied. While the Federal Government has successfully performed its appropriate functions in relation to foreign affairs and concerns evidently national, that of every State has remarkably improved in protecting and developing local interests and individual welfare; and if the vibrations of authority have occasionally tended too much toward one or the other, it is unquestionably certain that the ultimate operation of the entire system has been to strengthen all the existing institutions and to elevate our whole country in prosperity and renown.

The last, perhaps the greatest, of the prominent sources of discord and disaster supposed to lurk in our political condition was the institution of domestic slavery. Our forefathers were deeply impressed with the delicacy of this subject, and they treated it with a forbearance so evidently wise that in spite of every sinister foreboding it never until the present period disturbed the tranquillity of our common country. Such a result is sufficient evidence of the justice and the patriotism of their course; it is evidence not to be mistaken that an adherence to it can prevent all embarrassment from this as well as from every other anticipated cause of difficulty or danger. Have not recent events made it obvious to the slightest reflection that the least deviation from this spirit of forbearance is injurious to every interest, that of humanity included? Amidst the violence of excited passions this generous and fraternal feeling has been sometimes disregarded; and standing as I now do before my countrymen, in this high place of honor and of trust, I can not refrain from anxiously invoking my fellow-citizens never to be deaf to its dictates. Perceiving before my election the deep interest this subject was beginning to excite, I believed it a solemn duty fully to make known my sentiments in regard to it, and now, when every motive for misrepresentation has passed away, I trust that they will be candidly weighed and understood. At least they will be my standard of conduct in the path before me. I then declared that if the desire of those of my countrymen who were favorable to my election was gratified “I must go into the Presidential chair the inflexible and uncompromising opponent of every attempt on the part of Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia against the wishes of the slaveholding States, and also with a determination equally decided to resist the slightest interference with it in the States where it exists.” I submitted also to my fellow-citizens, with fullness and frankness, the reasons which led me to this determination. The result authorizes me to believe that they have been approved and are confided in by a majority of the people of the United States, including those whom they most immediately affect. It now only remains to add that no bill conflicting with these views can ever receive my constitutional sanction. These opinions have been adopted in the firm belief that they are in accordance with the spirit that actuated the venerated fathers of the Republic, and that succeeding experience has proved them to be humane, patriotic, expedient, honorable, and just. If the agitation of this subject was intended to reach the stability of our institutions, enough has occurred to show that it has signally failed, and that in this as in every other instance the apprehensions of the timid and the hopes of the wicked for the destruction of our Government are again destined to be disappointed. Here and there, indeed, scenes of dangerous excitement have occurred, terrifying instances of local violence have been witnessed, and a reckless disregard of the consequences of their conduct has exposed individuals to popular indignation; but neither masses of the people nor sections of the country have been swerved from their devotion to the bond of union and the principles it has made sacred. It will be ever thus. Such attempts at dangerous agitation may periodically return, but with each the object will be better understood. That predominating affection for our political system which prevails throughout our territorial limits, that calm and enlightened judgment which ultimately governs our people as one vast body, will always be at hand to resist and control every effort, foreign or domestic, which aims or would lead to overthrow our institutions.

What can be more gratifying than such a retrospect as this? We look back on obstacles avoided and dangers overcome, on expectations more than realized and prosperity perfectly secured. To the hopes of the hostile, the fears of the timid, and the doubts of the anxious actual experience has given the conclusive reply. We have seen time gradually dispel every unfavorable foreboding and our Constitution surmount every adverse circumstance dreaded at the outset as beyond control. Present excitement will at all times magnify present dangers, but true philosophy must teach us that none more threatening than the past can remain to be overcome; and we ought (for we have just reason) to entertain an abiding confidence in the stability of our institutions and an entire conviction that if administered in the true form, character, and spirit in which they were established they are abundantly adequate to preserve to us and our children the rich blessings already derived from them, to make our beloved land for a thousand generations that chosen spot where happiness springs from a perfect equality of political rights.

For myself, therefore, I desire to declare that the principle that will govern me in the high duty to which my country calls me is a strict adherence to the letter and spirit of the Constitution as it was designed by those who framed it. Looking back to it as a sacred instrument carefully and not easily framed; remembering that it was throughout a work of concession and compromise; viewing it as limited to national objects; regarding it as leaving to the people and the States all power not explicitly parted with, I shall endeavor to preserve, protect, and defend it by anxiously referring to its provision for direction in every action. To matters of domestic concernment which it has intrusted to the Federal Government and to such as relate to our intercourse with foreign nations I shall zealously devote myself; beyond those limits I shall never pass.

To enter on this occasion into a further or more minute exposition of my views on the various questions of domestic policy would be as obtrusive as it is probably unexpected. Before the suffrages of my countrymen were conferred upon me I submitted to them, with great precision, my opinions on all the most prominent of these subjects. Those opinions I shall endeavor to carry out with my utmost ability.

Our course of foreign policy has been so uniform and intelligible as to constitute a rule of Executive conduct which leaves little to my discretion, unless, indeed, I were willing to run counter to the lights of experience and the known opinions of my constituents. We sedulously cultivate the friendship of all nations as the condition most compatible with our welfare and the principles of our Government. We decline alliances as adverse to our peace. We desire commercial relations on equal terms, being ever willing to give a fair equivalent for advantages received. We endeavor to conduct our intercourse with openness and sincerity, promptly avowing our objects and seeking to establish that mutual frankness which is as beneficial in the dealings of nations as of men. We have no disposition and we disclaim all right to meddle in disputes, whether internal or foreign, that may molest other countries, regarding them in their actual state as social communities, and preserving a strict neutrality in all their controversies. Well knowing the tried valor of our people and our exhaustless resources, we neither anticipate nor fear any designed aggression; and in the consciousness of our own just conduct we feel a security that we shall never be called upon to exert our determination never to permit an invasion of our rights without punishment or redress.

In approaching, then, in the presence of my assembled countrymen, to make the solemn promise that yet remains, and to pledge myself that I will faithfully execute the office I am about to fill, I bring with me a settled purpose to maintain the institutions of my country, which I trust will atone for the errors I commit.

In receiving from the people the sacred trust twice confided to my illustrious predecessor, and which he has discharged so faithfully and so well, I know that I can not expect to perform the arduous task with equal ability and success. But united as I have been in his counsels, a daily witness of his exclusive and unsurpassed devotion to his country's welfare, agreeing with him in sentiments which his countrymen have warmly supported, and permitted to partake largely of his confidence, I may hope that somewhat of the same cheering approbation will be found to attend upon my path. For him I but express with my own the wishes of all, that he may yet long live to enjoy the brilliant evening of his well-spent life; and for myself, conscious of but one desire, faithfully to serve my country, I throw myself without fear on its justice and its kindness. Beyond that I only look to the gracious protection of the Divine Being whose strengthening support I humbly solicit, and whom I fervently pray to look down upon us all. May it be among the dispensations of His providence to bless our beloved country with honors and with length of days. May her ways be ways of pleasantness and all her paths be peace!

SOURCE: James B. Richardson, Editor, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, Volume 3, p. 313-20

Andrew Jackson’s Second Inaugural Address

March 4, 1833

Fellow-Citizens — The will of the American people, expressed through their unsolicited suffrages, calls me before you to pass through the solemnities preparatory to taking upon myself the duties of President of the United States for another term. For their approbation of my public conduct, through a period which has not been without its difficulties, and for this renewed expression of their confidence in my good intentions, I am at a loss for terms adequate to the expression of my gratitude. It shall be displayed, to the extent of my humble abilities, in continued efforts so to administer the Government, as to preserve their liberty and promote their happiness.

So many events have occurred within the last four years, which have necessarily called forth, sometimes under circumstances the most delicate and painful, my views of the principles and policy which ought to be pursued by the general Government, that I need on this occasion, but allude to a few leading considerations, connected with some of them.

The foreign policy adopted by our Government soon after the formation of our present Constitution, and very generally pursued by successive administrations, has been crowned with almost complete success, and has elevated our character among the nations of the earth. To do justice to all, and submit to wrong from none, has been, during my administration, its governing maxim; and so happy has been its results, that we are not only at peace with all the world, but have few causes of controversy; and those of minor importance, remaining unadjusted.

In the domestic policy of this Government, there are two objects which especially deserve the attention of the people and their Representatives, and which have been, and will continue to be, the subjects of my unceasing solicitude. They are, the preservation of the rights of the States, and the integrity of the Union.

These great objects are necessarily connected, and can only be attained by an enlightened exercise of the powers of each within its appropriate sphere, in conformity to the public will constitutionally expressed. To this end, it becomes the duty of all to yield a ready and patriotic submission to the laws constitutionally enacted, and thereby promote and strengthen a proper confidence in those institutions of the several States and of the United States, which the people themselves have ordained for their own government.

My experience in public concerns, and the observation of a life somewhat advanced, confirm the opinions long since imbibed by me, that the destruction of our State Governments, or the annihilation of their control over the local concerns of the people, would lead directly to revolution and anarchy, and finally to despotism and military domination. In proportion, therefore, as the General Government encroaches upon the rights of the States, in the same proportion does it impair its own power and detract from its ability to fulfil the purposes of its creation. Solemnly impressed with these considerations, my countrymen will ever find me ready to exercise my constitutional powers in arresting measures which may directly or indirectly encroach upon the rights of the States, or tend to consolidate all political power in the General Government. But of equal, and indeed of incalculable importance, is the Union of these States, and the sacred duty of all to contribute to its preservation by a liberal support of the General Government in the exercise of its just powers. You have been wisely admonished to “accustom yourselves to think and speak of the Union as of the palladium of your political safety and prosperity, watching for its preservation with jealous anxiety, discountenancing whatever may suggest even a suspicion that it can in any event be abandoned, and indignantly frowning upon the first dawning of any attempt to alienate any portion of our country from the rest, or to enfeeble the sacred ties which now link together the various parts.” Without union our independence and liberty would never have been achieved — without union they never can be maintained. Divided in twenty-four, or even a smaller number of separate communities, we shall see our internal trade burdened with numberless restraints and exactions; communication between distant points and sections obstructed, or cut off; our sons made soldiers to deluge with blood the fields they now till in peace; the mass of our people borne down and impoverished by taxes to support armies and navies; and military leaders at the head of their victorious legions becoming our lawgivers and judges. The loss of liberty, of all good government, of peace, plenty, and happiness must inevitably follow a dissolution of the Union. In supporting it, therefore, we support all that is dear to the freeman and the philanthropist.

The time at which I stand before you is full of interest. The eyes of all nations are fixed on our republic. The event of the existing crisis will be decisive in the opinion of mankind of the practicability of our federal system of Government. Great is the stake placed in our hands: great is the responsibility which must rest upon the people of the United States. Let us realize the importance of the attitude in which we stand before the world. Let us exercise forbearance and firmness. Let us extricate our country from the dangers which surround it, and learn wisdom from the lessons they inculcate.

SOURCE:  John F. Brown and William White, Editors, Messages of Gen. Andrew Jackson: with a Short Sketch of His Life, p. 247-9